注册 登录  
   显示下一条  |  关闭
温馨提示!由于新浪微博认证机制调整,您的新浪微博帐号绑定已过期,请重新绑定!立即重新绑定新浪微博》  |  关闭


non omnis moriar




A Strategy of Discriminate Power  

2014-09-02 09:12:52|  分类: 翻译资料 |  标签: |举报 |字号 订阅

  下载LOFTER 我的照片书  |

A Strategy of Discriminate Power: A Global Posture for Sustained Leadership

March 01, 2014

by Michael J. Mazarr

The leading challenge for U.S. grand strategy over the next decade is to exercise persistent global leadership under the shadow of intensifying constraints. These include fiscal shortfalls that limit resources, fading international deference to U.S. wishes, mismatches between the leading security challenges and instruments of power to confront those challenges, and the loss of key military superiorities alongside the appearance of new vulnerabilities. At stake are international stability and the safety of the U.S. homeland. The primary task for U.S. strategists now is to find a sustainable global role more appropriate to available means that can safeguard leading U.S. interests and avoid embroiling more limited U.S. power in secondary issues.

Tackling this daunting challenge of strategy—arriving at a more restrained and selective U.S. posture—would be more straightforward if the world no longer turned to the United States for leadership. Washington could comfortably trim its role and presence if the international system could maintain itself without a leading U.S. diplomatic, military and economic role; if the norms and institutions that sustain order, from global trade regimes to multilateral accords on such issues as cyber and climate, showed no worrisome cracks; or if Washington could pass substantial responsibility to a rising power with shared values. But none of these things is true.

International politics appears to be skidding into an inflection point at which norms, values, and institutions that have been crucial to maintaining the peace and encouraging shared interests are under assault, new rivalries are blossoming,1 and new sources of instability from radicalism to cyber conflict are becoming prevalent. To subtract another broadly stabilizing force—U.S. power— from the equation at such a delicate moment would risk peace and stability in ways profoundly damaging to U.S. interests. U.S. strategists thus face a powerful dilemma: the need for persistent, even in some cases intensified, global leadership with declining resources and leverage.

The United States needs a new recipe for national security capable of satisfying many conflicting requirements: leadership and restraint, global influence and reduced regional presence, decisiveness and selectivity. It does not need a new “grand strategy” per se; the appetite in official circles for overarching concepts appears limited, and in any case the essential aspects of a de facto grand strategy are already in place. What the United States needs, instead, is a new way of pursuing that long-standing and widely accepted grand strategy, a concept for developing more innovative and economical ways to achieve existing goals. The best candidate for such a concept could be called “discriminate power.”2


Closing the Means-End Gap

U.S. strategy for the whole post-Cold War era has rested in a demand for global primacy, asserting that U.S. power is the linchpin of the international system.3 The strategy held that the United States cannot allow any serious instability to go unchecked, and must maintain the capabilities necessary to underwrite this ambitious role. Because of its emphasis on the geopolitical risks of great power balancing, the current paradigm has emphasized traditional military power as the source of global credibility.

This approach is under assault from a variety of rising constraints.4 Geopolitically, many states (like China and Russia, but also including U.S. allies) chafe against U.S. primacy.5 Fiscally, declining defense budgets are generating fewer resources to underwrite key instruments of power. At the same time, U.S. military predominance is gradually ebbing, particularly in areas related to the most demanding missions such as power projection into hostile areas. Regional powers are gaining area denial capabilities, and small groups or individuals are acquiring new technologies and techniques, from cyber to biological agents, with unprecedented ability to counteract U.S. power.

Over time, persisting with existing approaches—even as financial, strategic, and political trends undercut them—will risk “strategic insolvency.”6 This would bring increasing resistance, economic ruin, and strategic failure with consequences harming U.S. credibility, diplomacy, and military operations. But the United States cannot respond simply by withdrawing from the world scene; the U.S. presence is critical in multiple areas, from climate change to terrorism to piracy to combating global organized crime.7 It is also crucial on the Korean border, in acting as the glue for the NATO alliance, and as the lead in potential responses to burgeoning and still unpredictable Chinese power.8 There is substantial evidence, both in the perceptions of others and in watching what happens to complex issues when the United States abandons a catalytic role, that U.S. leadership and deterrence underwrite the load- bearing elements of the international system.

Any new approach must therefore deal with a?fundamental paradox. To continue in our current?posture risks strategic bankruptcy, but to subtract?the stabilizing force of U.S. power from the global equation at a volatile moment would be to risk peace and stability.


A Changing Strategic Environment

The emerging security environment has a number of outstanding characteristics. It is increasingly multipolar, with more states claiming a right to set the global agenda. It harbors only a modest danger of large-scale, intentional aggressive conflict, even by revisionist or rogue powers such as Iran or North Korea. It will see the rise of astonishing new technologies, from engineered biology to nanotechnology to robotics to small-scale manufacturing, which will continue a long-term trend of empowering smaller or non-state actors. And the emerging era will in many ways be defined by nontraditional security threats. Taken together, these essential aspects of the emerging security environment suggest a number of primary conclusions for the character of the U.S. global role in any revised security posture.

First, the United States will have a declining role in stability and counterinsurgency operations. Post-Cold War security planning has focused on the risk of failed states and the associated threats stemming from them, such as regional instability, global criminal activity, piracy, disease, and most of all terrorism. Planning for neo-colonial interventions to promote stability in unstable, war-torn nations has occupied much U.S. attention over the last decade.9

But in fact, the era of expeditionary stabilization missions is now on the wane, for a number of reasons.10 The threat from failed states turns out to be more complex and widespread than was assumed fifteen years ago, and as a result now seems too all-embracing to jibe with targeted interventions. Then, too, the United States rediscovered over the last decade that it simply does not have the tools to be effective in these contexts. Stabilizing fragile states demands a wholesale transformation of political, economic, and sometimes social realities—a task that only time, leadership, and the organic process of social development can accomplish. The decisive factor is the desire—and the will—on the part of the local government to do what is necessary to win; this is a factor U.S. intervention cannot control, and indeed the larger our role, the less incentive the local government has to reform.11

Second, the United States will have a persistent but more limited role in regional conflicts. The incidence of large-scale violence has been declining in world politics, for profound reasons that go beyond a historical exception: adventurism doesn’t pay, states are too interlinked to be confident of winning at an acceptable price, and nuclear weapons deter aggression.12 Deterring and fighting major regional contingencies remains the primary engine of force structure requirements and procurement plans. The nature of the current environment, however, and the availability of innovative concepts for deterrence and warfighting, suggest that the United States can conceive of this mission in less resource-intensive and unilateral ways for the foreseeable future.

Third, the United States will have a persistent and growing role in sustaining international institutions and norms, which are badly fraying. With the rise of a multipolar system of prideful states and non-state actors, rivalries are likely to intensify.13 This trend is most apparent among the largest actors—the United States, China, and Russia—but it is also growing in regional contexts (between China and India, or between Brazil and large neighbors) and among traditional allies (like the South Korea–Japan territorial dispute). In economic terms, competing monetary and trade policies are driving wedges between leading powers. Because of its overwhelming importance to U.S. interests, preserving global stability could be seen as the single most important goal for U.S. national security strategy. Revalidating the norms, institutions, and relationships that ward off rising fragmentation is likely to be a leading role for U.S. power over the coming decades.

Fourth and finally, the United States will have a rising role in nontraditional security threats. These range from intentional techniques and tools—such as cyber attacks, economic harassment, terrorism, and biological weapons—to fragilities and instabilities residing in a complex, networked system, such as capital market volatility and the results of climate change; to resentments, grievances, and prideful assertions stemming from identity politics. As a result, forestalling strategically significant threats to the homeland will require more than balancing power. It will demand preserving the system’s stability and developing norms to bring pressure against would-be destabilizing agents.

Traditional forms of deterrence and diplomacy will prove less effective in dealing with such threats and dangers. It may be impossible, for example, to deter non-state global networks from using advanced weapons, and retaliation or coercive diplomacy is extremely difficult when states employ cyber militias to do their work with deniability. The dominant response to nontraditional risks will have to be a combination of enhanced domestic resiliency and a series of multilateral and institutionalized agreements, norms, and understandings to prompt joint action to control the scope of the threats.

Taken together, the elements of the emerging security context give several pieces of guidance to forming a more efficient security posture. First, present threats and opportunities are less significant, broadly speaking, than potential future ones. As a result, expressing the highest degree of deployed power today is less important than sustaining the long-term health of the military and investing in breakthrough technologies. Second, leading risks and challenges call for enhanced non-military and nontraditional tools of statecraft. Third, the growing systemic multipolarity means that U.S. statements and actions will have less influence on events—and that the United States must work even harder to draw others into maintaining norms and institutions. Fourth, the environment reflects a wide range of potential scenarios and outcomes, implying that we ought to invest in capabilities with the greatest utility across a range of mission areas; these might include intelligence and awareness assets, long-range timely strike, cyber, and human capital. Fifth and finally, the democratization of technology and technique means that we will not be able to rely on bulk, mass, or size,14 but will need a growing emphasis on indirect, asymmetric ways of achieving goals.


Toward a New Approach: The Promise of “Discriminate Power”

The problem today is not, as some have suggested, that the United States lacks a grand strategy. It is that the ways in which it pursues its well-established, implicit grand strategy are becoming insolvent, and that the international context is evolving in ways that U.S. strategy must shift to meet. The United States needs a new approach, and the best candidate can be termed “discriminate power.” It amounts to a prescription for conducting persistent global leadership in more guarded ways—the “practice of sustainable global leadership through more collaborative, tailored and selective means.”15 It pursues the same ends as the implicit U.S. grand strategy—domestic security and the movement toward a liberal, integrated global system—and it relies on the same general tools including the deterrent effects of U.S. military power, the use of economic statecraft to advance integration and prosperity, and advancing democracy. But it emphasizes key prioritization choices and revised, innovative mechanisms to operationalize these broad ways. It is a concept for how the implicit U.S. grand strategy employs its power to achieve long-standing ends.

Discriminate power is not a strategy of retrenchment. It does not contend that the essential route to addressing the dilemmas of U.S. strategy—the means/ends gap, the shifting strategic environment—is a withdrawal from the global scene. It strongly endorses the importance of an energetic, visionary U.S. leadership role. But the approach is built on the need to rethink the ways by which the United States performs this role, and to adopt tactics, techniques, doctrines, technologies, and strategies which are more creative, selective, and prioritized to emerging threats in the specific strategic environment the United States is likely to confront. Discriminate power offers five major principles to guide the changing execution of U.S. grand strategy.

First, discriminate power calls on the United States to broaden its understanding of which instruments of power can achieve particular goals. Over the last decade, the character of U.S. power has become militarized to an unprecedented degree, both in the application of resources and in the default tools applied to problems. Discovering new ways to address risks, threats, and opportunities demands increasing attention to tools of trade, finance, information, diplomacy, law, and other civilian realms. Discriminate power demands increasing investments in and reliance on these other forms of power. One example might be the challenge of weak states: rather than considering large-scale interventions, the United States can employ a range of more gradual, limited forms of aid, partnership, training, and light military footprint to encourage positive transitions over time.

A second principle suggests that the United States should reconsider the urgency of many national security challenges. The United States has most often fallen into strategic overstretch when it becomes victim of a perceived imperative to act immediately and dramatically. Time can be a critical ally in strategy, and on many issues the United States need not be in a hurry to resolve them. A more gradual approach can allow the use of different instruments of power and conserve resources as well as influence. This advice would, for example, question the rush to expand U.S. power in Asia to respond to an imminent Chinese strategic threat, and the associated demands on resources and diplomatic energy. China need not become an adversary; Beijing is also likely to confront serious social and economic challenges fairly soon that will slow its rise to regional dominance. In the application of military and other resources, the United States can take a longer-term, less urgent approach to this security issue.

Third, discriminate power calls on the United States to catalyze solutions rather than impose them.16 U.S. power, influence, and resources must increasingly draw other actors into the solution of major challenges, rather than trying to do things on its own. The Libyan operation, in which the United States underwrote the efforts of an international coalition to achieve shared goals, offers one positive recent example. Others include peacekeeping missions dominated by others but assisted and partly trained and equipped by a coalition including the United States; collaborative funding of clean-energy projects; or joint anti-piracy missions. Any strategy that proposes to engage more multilateral solutions must be realistic about the scope and quality of those efforts: the impetus for others to free-ride remains very strong as long as the United States remains committed to underwriting global stability. But working toward multilateral responses, even at the cost of defining the terms of the response and its timing, must remain a hallmark of a more discriminate U.S. approach to influence.

A fourth principle is to focus on capabilities that?provide the United States with the most disproportionate?comparative advantage. The United States should?prioritize systems, techniques, and investments?which offer clear technological, organizational, or?cultural advantage over potential competitors,?which negate or cancel out potential competitors’?core advantages, and which carry special value in?promoting international norms. Specific examples?of such capabilities include advanced command-?and-control/intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) tools that provide extensive awareness, diplomatic capabilities that underwrite participation in negotiations and institutions, and stand-off strike technologies that allow the United States to threaten global responses in short periods of time.

A fifth guideline is to boost emphasis on nontraditional security challenges, in particular through growing emphasis on societal resilience. Funding for cyber warfare is already reportedly growing, but more broadly, a core focus of security policy will be keeping societies resilient in the face of threats ranging from terrorism to cyber to the stability of financial markets. The United States needs a broad agenda for resilience in an environment of rising dangers to modern, interdependent, information-based societies.17 Given growing risks of asymmetric threats, U.S. influence and security in twenty years is likely to be more a function of its domestic resilience than its capacity to project expeditionary power.


Discriminate Power in Practice

How, then, would a United States guided by these five principles of discriminate power behave? What would its security posture look like? What choices would it make?

For one thing, a United States guided by discriminate power would pare down the specific planning objectives that flow from its global role. In such documents as the Guidance for the Employment of the Force and the National Military Strategy, the Defense Department lays out goals it aims to achieve in various regions. Those goals in turn drive requirements.18 A more discriminate approach would scrub these planning documents to root out wishful thinking and unnecessarily elaborate goals. At the same time, the United States should end the practice of judging the size and composition of its forces against some largely arbitrary number of “regional contingencies” that it believes it might have to fight. Going forward, U.S. strategists will have to be comfortable fielding a force that is judged based against a range of general criteria and attributes, rather than highly contingent estimates of how many brigades are needed for a fight against a regional adversary.

A United States employing discriminate power would replace elaborate and ambitious operational concepts with more modest ones. An outstanding example is in the area of stabilization operations, where the United States has alternatives to an interventionist approach. It could use drones and special operating forces to achieve targeted results against radical groups. It could return counterterrorism to its former status as a cross-government law enforcement challenge, maximizing the impact of investigations and prosecutions. It could employ expanded de-radicalization programs, some of which have had some success.19 Most fundamentally, it could decide to rely on advisory models to aid local governments in their fight, on the model of El Salvador or Colombia, rather than taking over the fight itself. (The notion of a “light footprint” approach to counterinsurgency and state-building reflects such thinking.)20 And it could, in this and other long-term roles, develop cadres of true long-term regional specialists, people deployed into specific contexts for decades at a time, to cultivate the local relationships and expertise necessary to have an effect out of proportion to their numbers.

Another core implication of discriminate power would be to emphasize flexible, transformative capabilities at the nexus of its various missions including in forward presence, contingency response, homeland defense, and others. A leading example would be a concept of timely, long-range influence across a range of domains—from military to information to economic—which would offer critical advantages to a U.S. military posture in an era of constraint. An ability to threaten powerful, immediate, targeted responses to aggressive or coercive actions from a distance would help compensate for smaller deployed forces and a declining ability to project them into denied areas. One could imagine, for example, a deterrent strategy toward North Korea that would combine, among other tools, cruise missiles launched from submarines; long- range, unmanned stealthy drones launched from around the region; cyber attacks; and a wide-ranging information campaign—across cellphones, telephones, e-mail, radio, and in the North Korean case, balloon-carried leaflets—designed to sow instability throughout their fragile system. Laying the groundwork for the success of such a multidimensional timely strike and influence campaign could become a major focus of regional contingency planning.

Partly because the threats and opportunities in the medium- to long-term are greater than those of the short-term, moreover, a United States employing principles of discriminate power would generally prioritize future investments over current power, emphasizing breakthrough technologies over the size of existing active-duty forces. But it would also be careful to protect the health, readiness, and quality of the force, for a variety of reasons: the premium on creativity and innovation, for example, and on high-quality personnel required to execute indirect and asymmetric strategies. One dangerous result of current cuts is that readiness accounts are once again being used as a catch-all source of savings, which puts the future quality of the force at risk.

Finally, a United States employing discriminate power would invest more heavily in its non-military instruments of power. A strategy more attuned to long-term, preventive, and collaborative solutions would require a stronger framework of diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, and informational tools. It would expand the size of the Foreign Service and USAID, boost the size and recapitalize the equipment of its Coast Guard, re-fund many public diplomacy programs in embassies, develop a highly expert cadre of country and regional experts deployed for long periods of time in the same place, and in other ways, shift the balance of resources slightly from military to non-military tools of statecraft.


The Case of Asia

To take a specific regional example, consider how a number of these principles might apply to the leading focus of U.S. security planning today—Asia. To begin with, discriminate power would suggest a continuing and renewed U.S. role in promoting regional stability, norms of conduct, and institutions that promote shared solutions to problems. This essential requirement for U.S. influence, of safeguarding the system against rising fragmenting tendencies, is more pronounced in Asia than anywhere.

In this context, however, discriminate power would urge us not to exaggerate perceived threats. U.S. deterrent promises must remain credible in Korea, but the North has no incentive for a war that would lead to its destruction. Likewise, while China is becoming more aggressive and even belligerent, nothing in its interests or recent history would suggest that we are dealing with a violently revisionist power intent on regional conquest. The United States has a network of alliances and partnerships throughout Asia, while China has very few friends and no true allies. To the extent that China becomes more aggressive toward its neighbors, it tends to spark a regional reaction that would counteract its rising power. This is not to suggest that the United States has no role to play in countering rising Chinese assertiveness—only that the United States can effectively play this role in a moderate, deliberate, and discriminate fashion.

Second, a strategy of discriminate power would recommend a renewed focus on what our real goals are in Asia, and ask whether we can achieve them with humbler specific objectives or more modest or innovative operating concepts. One aim, for example, is to keep China from coercing or even seizing territory from friends and allies. This essentially defensive requirement can be met in ways far short of the aggressive, forward-leaning plans that reportedly populate the Air–Sea Battle concept.21 This points to the need for more modest contingency plans that still sustain basic U.S. interests: preventing Chinese occupation of distant territories is a far less demanding requirement than projecting power close to its mainland.22 T.X. Hammes has recently argued for “offshore control” as an alternative to Air–Sea Battle, and this insightful approach is precisely the sort of less grandiose strategy that can still achieve essential U.S. objectives with less demanding forces and concepts.23 (As noted above, moreover, U.S. strategy in Korea could adopt a more multidimensional approach to deterrence and warfighting.)

Third, while reaffirming the importance of a U.S. presence in Asia, discriminate power would suggest meeting the goal with primarily non- military means. A series of powerful diplomatic and economic initiatives can signal continued U.S. involvement even better than a given number of days of carrier presence, or a Marine battalion in Australia. Despite repeated statements that the pivot or rebalance to Asia is primarily a civilian initiative,24 many of its actual steps have focused on traditional military capabilities—like locally- deployed ground forces, new or expanded military bases, or large and powerful naval strike groups.25 Yet, military capabilities are vulnerable to area-denial weapons and exacerbate Chinese threat perceptions. Washington would get better bang for its buck, and create a more sustainable approach, by focusing on expanded diplomatic presence with larger public diplomacy elements; regional trade accords and collaboration on financial markets; and multilateral processes to address shared challenges such as climate change.

Fourth, discriminate power would urge a new emphasis on preventive mechanisms of confidence-building, transparency, and conflict resolution. The United States has been rightly hesitant to become enmeshed in the local disputes of others, especially over long-held territorial claims. But leading a regional process of confidence-building seems essential, especially to address the risk of miscalculation or misperception that remain the most likely routes to war. One example could be a regional ISR network designed to promote mutual awareness; another might be expanded sponsorship of Track-2 dialogues across Asia among scholars and thought-leaders to help undercut the sources of rising mutual hostility.

Fifth, in Asia as elsewhere, the United States needs the sort of capabilities emphasized above for timely, long-range precision strike. These can help make up for a shrinking forward presence in the region as well as rising capabilities for area denial. From ballistic and cruise missiles to stealthy unmanned systems to subsurface platforms to transformational new systems, the United States needs relatively inexpensive means of penetrating and delivering precise strikes that does not demand large-scale force deployments.

Sixth, as part of its effort to revalidate the credibility of its presence in Asia, the United States should enhance deterrence capabilities in nontraditional areas, from cyber to economic instruments of statecraft. Others will increasingly seek to use such tools to deter, prevent, or punish U.S. participation in regional contingencies. As is now widely recognized, we need better defensive as well as offensive capabilities in these areas.

Seventh and finally, the United States must continue to work to enhance the capabilities of partners in the region. The nature of the security environment, and the risks posed by specific states, suggest that we can rely on multilateral responses to many of the most extreme security risks. Foreign military sales, combined training and education, military-to-military exchanges, long-term special forces deployments for training and mutual understanding—these and other steps can improve throughout the region. But partnerships need not focus on military components alone; developing non-military relationships and capabilities should remain a high priority for the United States.


A Strategic Concept for Sustainable Leadership

A key task for any revised approach is to limit and mitigate the strategic risk that any reduction in the existing U.S. security posture might create. Discriminate power seeks to do this in two fundamental ways: By applying resources in the most productive areas—technologies of greater comparative advantage, instruments of statecraft best aligned to the nature of emerging threats—and by developing innovative concepts to achieve existing ends in more frugal ways.

Twenty years from now, the United States will have moved into a new role on the world stage. It is likely to be humbler and more constrained, but still critical to global peace and stability. The question now is whether U.S. strategy can evolve to meet the essential paradox it confronts: the need to adjust a global role that remains unique and important. Discriminate power offers one option for the sustainable pursuit of an established grand strategy under new conditions.



  1. See Michael J. Mazarr, “Rivalry’s New Face,” Survival 54, no. 4 (2012): 84–106, http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2012-23ab/survival--globa... strategy-august--september-2012-f9ce/54-4-08-mazarr-ec90.?
  2. This essay reflects an elaboration of ideas developed in a study group at the National Defense University; see Michael J. Mazarr and the National Defense University study group, Discriminate Power: A Strategy for a Sustainable National Security Posture (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 2013). While the co- participants in that study bear no responsibility for the arguments in this essay, the author extends his grateful thanks for their partnership in developing the foundations of the argument, and recognizes their contribution to its development.
  3. This general argument about the rising constraints on U.S. power is drawn from Michael J. Mazarr, “The Risks of Ignoring Strategic Insolvency,” The Washington Quarterly, 35, no. 4 (2012): 7–22, csis.org/files/publication/twq12FallMazarr.pdf.?
  4. The case against the significance, necessity or inevitability of the U.S. global role as it is currently conceived is made in such places as Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993); “The End of Pax Americana,” The Atlantic, April 26, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/the-end-of-pax-americana-how-western-decline-became- inevitable/256388/; Andrew Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); and Ted Galen Carpenter, “Delusions of Indispensability,” The National Interest 124 (March-April 2013),http://nationalinterest.org/article/delusions-indispensability-8145.
  5. Good research on this point can be found in such sources as Mark Beeson, “U.S. Hegemony and Southeast Asia,” Critical Asian Studies 36, no. 3 (2004); T. V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in an Age of U.S. Primacy,” International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005); and Steven M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Hegemony (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005), esp. chapters 2 and 3. Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy,” International Security 34, no. 4 (Spring 2010).
  6. This case is made in Mazarr, “The Risks of Ignoring Strategic Insolvency,” op. cit., esp. 12–16.?
  7. An interesting analysis of the continued requirement for the unique U.S. role even under constraint is Eric Edelman, Understanding America’s Contested Primacy (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010). Joseph Joffe argues for the criticality of the U.S. role in “The Default Power,” Foreign Affairs, 88, no. 2 (September/October 2009),http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65225/josef-joffe/the-default-power.
  8. On Japan’s changing perceptions, see Michael D. Swaine et al., China’s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 2013), 119–120; Kirk Spitzer, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance is Doing Fine, But...” Time, April 13, 2013, http://nation.time.com/2013/04/13/u-s-japan-alliance-is-doing-fine-but/; and Chun Han Wong, “Vietnamese Prime Minister Welcomes Larger Role for U.S.,” The Wall Street Journal, June 1, 2013,http://blogs.wsj.com/searealtime/2013/06/01/vietnamese- ?prime-minister-welcomes-larger-role-for-u-s/.
  9. This case was made most influentially in Thomas P. M. Barnett, “The Pentagon’s ?New Map,” Esquire, March 2003,http://www.esquire.com/features/ESQ0303-MAR_ WARPRIMER; Barnett’s argument—that “disconnectedness defines danger” and that “exporting security to shrink the Gap” defined the future U.S. security challenge— directly and indirectly shaping much of the security paradigm of the next decade.
  10. This argument is made in more depth in Michael J. Mazarr, “The Rise and Fall of the Failed States Paradigm,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 1 (January-February 2014).
  11. A superb source in this regard is Michael Wesley, “The State of the Art on the Art of State Building,” Global Governance 14 (2008). See also Robert M. Chamberlain, “With Friends Like These: Grievance, Governance, and Capacity-Building in COIN,” Parameters, Summer 2008.
  12. See for example Joshua Goldstein, Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide (New York: Dutton, 2011).
  13. See Mazarr, “Rivalry’s New Face.” Op. cit.
  14. A similar argument is made in Moise ?s Na ??m, The End of Power (New York: Basic ?Books, 2013), especially chapter 6.
  15. Mazarr et al., Discriminate Power, Op. cit., 10. Once again I am indebted to members of ?the NDU study group for the development of the concept.
  16. A model for and endorsement of this goal can be found in Nina Hachigian and Mona ?Sutphen, “Strategic Collaboration: How the United States Can Thrive as Other Powers Rise,” The Washington Quarterly 31, no. 4 (Autumn 2008),https://csis.org/files/ publication/twq08autumnhachigian.pdf?. See also Charles A. Kupchan, “After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity,” International Security 23, no. 2 (Autumn 1998).
  17. There are now dozens of books on the cyber threat, but still only a handful dealing with the broader problem of social resilience as a national security priority. Two examples are Chris Demchak, Wars of Disruption and Resilience (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011); and Louise K. Comfort et al., eds., Designing Resilience: Preparing for Extreme Events (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010). An interesting treatment of the cyber resilience problem from a broadly strategic standpoint is Martin Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2009).
  18. See for example Patrick C. Sweeney, “A Primer for: Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) System, and Global Force Management (GFM),” U.S. Naval War College, July 29, 2011, http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/ocs/cdg/GEF-JSCP-APEX-NWC %20Primer.pdf; and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Instruction on the Joint Strategic Planning System, September 5, 2013 version, available at http://www.dtic. mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3100_01.pdf.
  19. See for example John Horgan and Mary Beth Altier, “The Future of Terrorist De- Radicalization Programs,” The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, (Summer-Fall 2012). For a survey of a number of programs that takes a more guarded view of their potential, see Angela Rebasa et al., Deradicalizing Isamist Extremists (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2010); available online at http://www.rand.org/pubs/ monographs/MG1053.html.
  20. The best short summary of this issue is Fernando Lujan, “Light Footprints: The Future of American Military Intervention” (Washington, D.C.:Center for a New American Security, 2013).?
  21. See Amitai Etzioni, “Air-Sea Battle: A Dangerous Way to Deal with China,” The Diplomat, September 3, 2013,http://thediplomat.com/2013/09/03/air-sea-battle-a- dangerous-way-to-deal-with-china/.
  22. These arguments are engaged in Michael D. Swaine et al., China’s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013).?
  23. See T. X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict,” Strategic Forum, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2012.
  24. See for example the March 2013 speech by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisory-president-united- states-a.
  25. See for example David Alexander, “U.S. Rebalance to the Pacific Gaining Steam, Pentagon Chief Says,” Reuters, June 1, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/ 01/us-security-asia-usa-idUSBRE95002820130601.


阅读(159)| 评论(0)
推荐 转载



<#--最新日志,群博日志--> <#--推荐日志--> <#--引用记录--> <#--博主推荐--> <#--随机阅读--> <#--首页推荐--> <#--历史上的今天--> <#--被推荐日志--> <#--上一篇,下一篇--> <#-- 热度 --> <#-- 网易新闻广告 --> <#--右边模块结构--> <#--评论模块结构--> <#--引用模块结构--> <#--博主发起的投票-->


网易公司版权所有 ©1997-2018